In the late 1890s, Emile Durkheim began to search for the mechanisms generating solidarity in human societies.¹ Durkheim had long taught a course on the sociology of religion, but his thinking began to change once he started searching more explicitly for the mechanisms producing solidarity. In his last great work—*The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*²—Durkheim reviewed the data on what he thought to be the most primitive society—the Arunta aboriginals of central Australia. By removing the complexity of more industrial societies, Durkheim felt that he could see the essential mechanisms for social solidarity. From the descriptions of the Arunta in and around Alice Springs, Australia, the Arunta from outlying areas would periodically gather, which in turn set off animated talk and emotions, or what Durkheim termed “effervescence,” among those gathered. Over time, apparently, the Arunta began to see an external force pushing on them as they gathered in what can best be described as a kind of carnival; furthermore, feeling this force, they needed to symbolize it with totems celebrating the power of supernatural forces. Once in place, these totems would be the objects of rituals reaffirming the sense of solidarity in these preliterate societies. Durkheim thought that these carnivals were the origins of religion, but for his purposes, they were also the basis of group solidarity. It is through (a) interaction, (b) contagious emotional effervescence, (c) symbolic representations of the power of this effervescence in totems, and (d) rituals directed to these totems that solidarity ultimately arises. Among preliterate populations, these forces led to the creation of religion as the Arunta and other preliterate populations symbolized the power of their own relations, believing it to be the power of the supernatural, when in fact, it was the power of people themselves.

Durkheim also began to realize that in his earlier work in 1892—*The Division of Labor in Society*³—he had not quite captured a key element of integration in complex societies. When societies are differentiated, it is still possible to develop society-wide solidarities—emotionally charged commitments to the social whole—by rituals directed as highly generalized symbols

¹Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (New York: Free Press, 1947, originally published in 1912), but long before publishing this book, Durkheim had wondered about whether he had missed a key force of societal integration in his earlier work.

²Ibid.

representing the entire society. People may lead somewhat different daily lives because of their
diverse locations in the divisions of labor in differentiated societies, but they can still “worship”
lke the Arunta the larger social whole—for Durkheim, all of French society—by enacting
emotion-arousing rituals to totems symbolizing the society. The totems did not have to be
physical objects like an actual totem pole; they could be other forms of symbolism, such as the
French's long standing insistence on not “polluting” their language with words and phrases
from other languages. Indeed, Durkheim as a dominant figure in education worked to have the
school systems secularized in France, with the teacher substituting for the priest in religion and
leading students in daily rituals directed at totems, such as the flag and other symbols of France.

This line of argument had enormous influence on a number of modern-day theorists,
such as Randall Collins's analysis of interaction rituals in his conflict theory (see Chapter
3), but Collins was influenced not just by Durkheim but also by the founder of dramaturgical
theorizing in the United States, Erving Goffman. I have emphasized Durkheim above
because dramaturgy is often seen as a variant of symbolic interactionism, but Goffman did
not see himself as an intellectual descendant of George Herbert Mead (see last chapter), the
intellectual founder of symbolic interactionism. Goffman always claimed that he was a
Durkheimian, focusing on the processes by which ritualized actions of individuals in face-
to-face encounters make societies possible. He saw self as important in this process because
individuals do make self-presentations to others, but these are not so much reflective of
a deeply sedimented sense of identity as strategic practices in a given situation to carry
out a line of action vis-à-vis others. He was doubtful that people have stable identities that
they are always seeking to verify; instead, self is part of a strategic game to bring off an
interaction and realize whatever purposes are being pursued by individuals. Thus, there is a
very large shift in emphasis with dramaturgy compared to symbolic interactionism.

**Erving Goffman’s Dramaturgical Theory of Encounters**

**The Dramaturgical Metaphor**

Goffman's approach is termed *dramaturgy* because of the analogy made to the theater—an analogy
that is as least as old as Shakespeare. For Goffman, interaction typically has a normative script
or a relatively clear set of expectations about how individuals are supposed to behave. Yet, within the
script, a considerable amount of dramatic license is possible; individuals can play the role demanded
by the script in many ways, with a personal style reflecting the kind of “line” that a person is taking
in his or her self-presentations. There is also a stage that has an ecology (configuration of space) and
props that can be used to carry off a dramatic performance. There is always an audience, whether
actually present or imagined by actor. Self is presented to establish a particular kind of connection
with the audience. Finally, Goffman emphasized that actors are always behaving strategically; they
often have agendas, and their behaviors to an audience reflect their agenda, even if the agenda is
hidden from the audience. For example, a “con man” strategically presents self to the audience (e.g.,
sincere, trustworthy, honest) but, in fact, hides the real strategic purposes (e.g., to cheat the “mark”
of money). So, the analogy to the theater is tempered by the people that deliberately manipulate their
self-presentation so as “to put on an act” for strategic and often nefarious purposes.
Encounters

Goffman generally employed the terms unfocused and focused to denote two basic types of interaction. Unfocused interaction “consists of interpersonal communications that result solely by virtue of persons being in one another’s presence, as when two strangers across the room from each other check up on each other’s clothing, posture, and general manner, while each modifies his (her) own demeanor because he himself is under observation.” Such unfocused interaction is, Goffman argued, an important part of the interaction order, for much of what people do is exchange glances and monitor each other in public places. Focused interaction, in contrast, “occurs when people effectively agree to sustain for a time a single focus of cognitive and visual attention, as in a conversation, a board game, or a joint task sustained by a close face-to-face circle of contributors.”

Focused Encounters

An encounter is defined as focused interaction revealing the following characteristics:

1. A single visual and cognitive focus of attention
2. A mutual and preferential openness to verbal communication
3. A heightened mutual relevance of acts
4. An eye-to-eye ecological huddle, maximizing mutual perception and monitoring
5. An emergent “we” feeling of solidarity and flow of feeling
6. A ritual and ceremonial punctuation of openings, closings, entrances, and exits
7. A set of procedures for corrective compensation for deviant acts

To sustain itself, an encounter develops a membrane, or penetrable barrier to the larger social world in which the interaction is located. The membrane of an encounter is sustained by a set of rules. In Encounters, Goffman lists several; later, in what is probably his most significant work, Interaction Ritual, he lists several more. Let me combine both discussions by listing the rules that guide focused interaction in encounters:

1. Rules of irrelevance, which “frame” a situation as excluding certain materials (attributes of participants, psychological states, cultural values and norms, etc.)
2. Rules of transformation, which specify how materials moving through the membrane created by rules of irrelevance are to be altered to fit into the interaction

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5 Ibid., p 31.
6 Ibid., p 33; see the key earlier work where these ideas were first developed: Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1959).
3. **Rules of realized resources**, which provide a general schemata and framework for expression and interpretation for activities among participants

4. **Rules of talk**, which are the procedures, conventions, and practices guiding the flow of verbalizations with respect to
   a. Maintaining a single focus of attention
   b. Establishing “clearance cues” for determining when one speaker is done and another can begin
   c. Determining how long and how frequently any one person can hold the floor
   d. Regulating interruptions and lulls in the conversation
   e. Sanctioning participants whose attention wanders to matters outside the conversation
   f. Ensuring that nearby people do not interfere with the conversation
   g. Guiding the use of politeness and tact, even in the face of disagreements

5. **Rules of self-respect**, which encourage participants to honor with tact and etiquette their respective efforts to present themselves in a certain light

Interaction is thus guided by complex configurations of rules that individuals learn how to use and apply in different types of encounters, logged in varying types of gatherings and social occasions. The “reality” of the world is, to a very great extent, sustained by people’s ability to invoke and use these rules. When these rules are operating effectively, individuals develop a “state of euphoria,” or what Randall Collins has termed enhanced “emotional energy” (see Chapter 3). However, encounters are vulnerable to “dysphoria” or tension when these rules do not exclude troublesome external materials or fail to regulate the flow of interaction. Such failures are seen by Goffman as incidents or breaches. When these breaches can be effectively handled by tact and corrective procedures, they are then viewed as integrations because they are blended into the ongoing encounter. The key mechanism for avoiding dysphoria and maintaining the integration of the encounter is the use of ritual.

**Ritual**

In *Interaction Ritual*, Goffman’s great contribution is the recognition that minor, seemingly trivial, and everyday rituals—such as “Hello, how are you?” “Good morning,” “Please, after you,” and other standardized forms of talk—are crucial to the maintenance of social order—just as much as the larger rituals emphasized by Durkheim among the Arunta aborigines were seen to sustain the social order. In Goffman’s own words, his goal is to reformulate “Émile Durkheim’s social psychology in a modern dress” by recognizing that, when individuals gather and begin to interact, their behaviors are highly ritualized. That is, actors punctuate each phase of interpersonal contact with stereotypical sequences of behavior that invoke the rules of the encounter and, at the same time, become the medium or vehicle by which the rules are followed. Rituals are thus essential for (a) mobilizing individuals to participate in interaction; (b) making them cognizant of the relevant rules of irrelevance,

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*Ibid. p. 39, especially Durkheim’s later work in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (see note 1 for full citation).*
transformation, resource use, and talk; (c) guiding them during the course of the interaction; and (d) helping them correct for breaches and incidents.

Among the most significant are those rituals revolving around deference and demeanor. Deference pertains to interpersonal rituals that express individuals’ respect for others, their willingness to interact, their affection and other emotions, and their engagement in the encounter. In Goffman’s words, deference establishes “marks of devotion” by which an actor “celebrates and confirms his (her) relationship to a recipient.” Thus, seemingly innocuous gestures—“It’s nice to see you again,” “How are things?” “What are you doing?” “Good-bye,” “See you later,” and many other stereotypical phrases as well as bodily movements—are rituals that present a demeanor invoking relevant rules and guiding the opening, sequencing, and closing of the interaction.

Deferece rituals, Goffman argued, can be of two types: (1) avoidance rituals and (2) presentational rituals. Avoidance rituals are those that an individual uses to keep distance from another and to avoid violating the “ideal sphere” that lies around the other. Such rituals are most typical among unequals. Presentational rituals communicate how a person regards others—as equals, inferiors, or superiors—and how he expects others to treat this person. Goffman saw interaction as constantly involving a dialectic between avoidance and presentational rituals as individuals respect each other and maintain distance while trying to make contact and get things done.

In contrast, demeanor is ceremonial behavior revolving around deportment, dress, and general bearing that informs others about an individual as a person of certain desirable or undesirable qualities. Through demeanor rituals, individuals present images of themselves to others and, at the same time, communicate that they are reliable, trustworthy, and tactful—even if this is just a ruse.

Thus, through deference and demeanor rituals, individuals plug themselves into an encounter by invoking relevant rules and demonstrating their capacity to follow them, while indicating their respect for others and presenting themselves as certain kinds of individuals. The enactment of such deference and demeanor rituals in concrete gatherings, especially encounters but also including unfocused situations, provides a basis for the integration of society.

Roles

As people present a front, invoke relevant rules, emit rituals, and offer demeanor and deference behaviors, they also try to orchestrate a role for themselves vis-à-vis others. Roles are bundles of activity that others recognize as marking a particular line of behavior or role. Indeed, persons are expected to try and make a role for themselves, and this role should be consistent with the personal qualities that a person has tried to communicate to others through their demeanor, self-presentations, and fronts (stage props, expressive equipment, appearance). If there is inconsistency between the attempted role and these additional aspects of a performance, then others in the situation are likely to sanction the individual through subtle cues and gestures. These others are driven to do so because discrepancy between another’s role and other performance cues disrupts the definition of the situation and the underlying sense of reality that this definition promotes. Thus, role-playing is a highly contingent on the responses and reactions of others. Once approved by others, it is difficult to change a role in a situation because this would require too much work on part of others and would disrupt the established routines in a situation.

9Goffman, Interaction Ritual, pp. 56–67 (see note 7).
Yet, people often get stuck in roles that they perceive to be incompatible with their image of themselves. Under these conditions, persons will display what Goffman termed role distance, whereby a “separation” of the person from a role is communicated. Such distancing, Goffman argued, allows the individual to (a) release the tension associated with a role considered to be “beneath his (her) dignity,” (b) present additional aspects of self that extend beyond the role, and (c) remove the burden of “complete compliance to the role,” thereby making minor transgressions less dramatic and troublesome for others.

Role distance is one aspect of the more general process of role embracement. Persons will reveal varying degrees of attachment and involvement in the role, with one extreme being role distance and with the other extreme being engrossment, or complete involvement in a role. Roles over which individuals have control are likely to involve high degrees of embracement, whereas those roles in which the individual is subordinate will be played with considerable role distance.

Self

Goffman’s views self as highly situational and contingent on the responses of others. Although one of the main activities of actors in a situation is to present themselves to others, Goffman was highly skeptical about a “core,” “person-level,” or “transitional” self-conception that is part of an individual’s “personality.” For Goffman, individuals do not have an underlying “personality” or “identity” that is carried from situation to situation—as most symbolic interactionists would argue (see last chapter). Still, people present images of themselves in a particular situation, and others’ reactions to this presentation are central dynamics in all encounters. Individuals constantly emit demeanor cues that project images of themselves as certain kinds of persons; people are thus always engaged in a performance, as they act out a line. Individuals seek to stay in face or to maintain face by presenting an image of themselves through their line that is supported by the responses of others and, if possible, sustained by impersonal agencies in a situation. Conversely, a person is in wrong face or out of face when the line emitted is inappropriate and unacceptable to others. Thus, a person’s face is only on loan because others must approve of an individual’s line of conduct.

Yet, people will generally try to allow another to present and stay in a given face, if they can. They communicate with subtle body gestures and verbal utterances their verification of a given face; in so doing, they confirm the definition of the situation and promote a sense of a common reality. Because people’s sense of what is real depends upon an agreed definition of the situation, a given line and face in an encounter will be difficult to change, once established. For, to alter face (and the line by which it is presented) would require redefining the situation and recreating a sense of reality—which can be stressful and which can often breach the interaction.

Face engagements are usually initiated with eye contact, and once initiated, they involve ritual openings appropriate to the situation (as determined by length of last engagement, amount of time since previous engagement, level of inequality, and so forth). During the course of the face engagement, each individual uses tact to maintain, if possible, each others presentations of “face” and the line of conduct that this presentations of self requires. Participants seek to avoid “a scene” or breach in the situation, and so they use tact and etiquette to save their own face and that of others. Moreover, as deemed appropriate for the type of encounter (as well as for the larger gathering and more
inclusive social occasion), individuals will attempt to maintain what Goffman sometimes termed the *territories of self*, revolving around such matters as physical props, ecological space, personal preserve (territory around one’s body), and conversational rights (to talk and be heard), which are necessary for people to execute their line and maintain face. In general, the higher the rank of individuals, the greater their *territories of self* in an encounter. To violate such territories disrupts or breaches the situation, forcing remedial action by participants to restore their respective lines, face, definitions of the situation, and sense of reality.

**Talk**

Throughout his work, Goffman emphasized the significance of verbalizations for focusing people’s attention.\(^{11}\) Talk is used to open and close interactions, to seek intersubjectivity among individuals, to frame what should be talked about, to rhythmically structure the interaction through turn-taking in a conversation, and to shift topics. Talk is thus a crucial mechanism for drawing individuals together, focusing their attention, and adjudicating an overall definition of the situation. Because talk is so central to focusing interaction, it is normatively regulated and ritualized. Other forms of quasi talk are also regulated and ritualized. For example, response cues or “exclamatory interjections which are not full-fledged words” — “Oops,” “Wow,” “Oh,” and “Yikes” — are regulated as to when they can be used and the way they are uttered. Verbal fillers—“ah,” “uh,” “um,” and the like—are also ritualized and are used to facilitate “conversational tracking.” In essence, they indicate that “the speaker does not have, as of yet, the proper word but is working on the matter” and that he or she is still engaged in the conversation. Even seemingly emotional cues and tabooed expressions, such as all the “four-letter words,” are not so much an expression of emotion as “self-other alignment” and assert that “our inner concerns should be theirs.” Such outbursts are normative and ritualized because this “invitation into our interiors tends to be made only when it will be easy to other persons present to see where the voyage takes them.”\(^{12}\)

In creating a definition of the situation, Goffman argued, talk operates in extremely complex ways. When individuals talk, they create a *footing*, or assumed foundation for the conversation and the interaction. Because verbal symbols are easily manipulated, people can readily change the footing or basic premises underlying the conversation. Such shifts in footing are, however, highly ritualized and usually reveal clear markers. For example, when a person says something like “Let’s not talk about that,” the footing of the conversation is shifted, but in a ritualized way; similarly, when someone utters a phrase like “That’s great, but what about . . . ?” this person is also changing the footing through ritual.

Shifts in footing raise a question that increasingly dominated Goffman’s later works: the issue of embedding. Goffman came to recognize that conversations are layered and, hence, embedded in different footings. There are often multiple footings for talk, as when someone “says one thing but means another” or when a person “hints” or “implies” something else. These “layerings” of conversations, which embed them in different contexts, are possible because speech is capable of generating subtle and complex meanings. For example, irony, sarcasm, puns, wit, double-entendres, inflections, shadings, and other manipulations of speech

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12Ibid., p. 85.
demonstrate the capacity of individuals to shift footings and contextual embeddings of a conversation (for example, think of a conversation in a work setting involving romantic flirtations; it will involve constant movement in footing and context). Yet, for encounters to proceed smoothly, these alterations in footing are, to some extent, normatively regulated.

Disruption and Repair

Goffman stressed that disruption in encounters is never a trivial matter. When a person emits gestures that contradict normative roles, present a contradictory front, fail to enact appropriate rituals, seek an inappropriate role, attempt a normatively or ritually incorrect line, or present a wrong face, there is potential for a scene. From the person’s point of view, there is a possibility of embarrassment, to use Goffman’s favorite phrase; once embarrassed, an individual’s responses can further degenerate in an escalating cycle of ever greater levels of embarrassment. From the perspective of others, a scene disrupts the definition of the situation and threatens the sense of reality necessary for them to feel comfortable. Individuals implicitly assume that people are reliable and trustworthy, that they are what they appear to be, that they are competent, and that they can be relied on. Thus, when a scene occurs, these implicit assumptions are challenged and threaten the organization of the encounter (and, potentially, the larger gathering and social occasion in which the encounter is embedded).

For this reason, an individual will seek to repair a scene caused by the use of inappropriate gestures, and others will use tact to assist the individual in such repair efforts. The sense of order of a situation is thus sustained by a variety of corrective responses by individuals and by the willingness of others to use tact in ignoring minor mistakes and, if this is not possible, to employ tact to facilitate an offending individual’s corrective efforts. People “disattend” much potentially discrepant behavior, and when this is no longer an option, they are prepared to accept apologies, accounts, new information, excuses, and other ritually and normatively appropriate efforts at repair. Of course, this willingness to accept people as they are, to assume their competence, and to overlook minor interpersonal mistakes makes them vulnerable to manipulation and deceit.

Unfocused Encounters

Goffman was one of the few sociologists to recognize that behavior and interaction in public places, or in unfocused settings, are important features of the interaction order and, by extension, of social organization in general. Such simple acts as walking down the street, standing in line, sitting in a waiting room or on a park bench, standing in an elevator, going to and from a public restroom, and many other activities represent a significant realm of social organization. These unfocused situations in which people are co-present but not involved in prolonged talk and “face encounters” represent a crucial topic of sociological inquiry—a topic that is often seen as trivial but that embraces much of people’s time and attention.

13Goffman, Interaction Ritual (see note 7).

Unfocused gatherings are like focused interactions in their general contours: They are normatively regulated; they call for performances by individuals; they include the presentation of a self; they involve the use of rituals; they have normatively and ritually appropriate procedures for repair; and they depend on a considerable amount of etiquette, tact, and inattention. Let me explore each of these features in somewhat greater detail.

Much like a focused interaction, unfocused gatherings involve normative rules concerning spacing, movement, positioning, listening, talking, and self-presentation. But, unlike focused interaction, norms do not have to sustain a well-defined membrane. There is no closure, intense focus of attention, or face-to-face obligations in unfocused encounters. Rather, rules pertain to how individuals are to comport themselves without becoming the focus of attention and involved in a face encounter. Rules are thus about how to move, talk, sit, stand, present self, apologize, and perform other actions necessary to sustain public order without creating a situation requiring the additional interpersonal “work” of focused interaction.

When in public, individuals still engage in performances, but because the audience is not involved in a face engagement or prolonged tracks of talk, the presentation can be more muted and less animated. Goffman used a variety of terms to describe these presentations, two of the most frequent being body idiom and body gloss. Both terms denote the overall configuration of gestures, or demeanor, that an individual makes available and gleanable to others. (Conversely, others are constantly scanning to determine the content of others’ body idiom and body gloss.) Such demeanor denotes a person’s direction, speed, resoluteness, purpose, and other aspects of a course of action. In Relations in Public, Goffman enumerated three types of body gloss: (1) orientation gloss, or gestures giving evidence to others confirming that a person is engaged in a recognizable and appropriate activity in the present time and place; (2) circumspection gloss, or gestures indicating to others that a person is not going to encroach on or threaten the activity of others; and (3) overplay gloss, or gestures signaling that a person is not constrained or under duress and is, therefore, fully in charge and control of his or her other movements and actions. Thus the public performance of an individual in unfocused interaction revolves around providing information that one is of “sound character and reasonable competency.”

In public and during unfocused interactions, the territories of self become an important consideration. Goffman listed various kinds of territorial considerations that can become salient during unfocused interaction, including (a) fixed geographical spaces attached to a particular person, (b) egocentric preserves of non-encroachment that surround individuals as they move in space, (c) personal spaces that others are not to violate under any circumstances, (d) stalls or bounded places that an individual can temporarily claim, (e) use-spaces that can be claimed as an individual engages in some instrumental activity, (f) turns or the claimed order of doing or receiving something relative to others in a situation, (g) possessional territory or objects identified with self and arrayed around an individual’s body, (h) informational preserve or the

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16Ibid.


18Ibid., p. 162.

19Ibid., Chapter 2.
body of facts about a person that is controlled and regulated, and (i) *conversational preserve* or the right to control who can summon and talk to an individual. Depending on the type of unfocused interaction, as well as on the number, age, sex, rank, position, and other characteristics of the participants, the territories of self will vary, but in all societies, there are clearly understood norms about which configuration of these territories is relevant, and to what degree it can be invoked.

These territories of self are made visible through what Goffman termed *markers*. Markers are signals and objects that denote the type of territorial claim, its extent and boundary, and its duration. Violation of these markers involves an encroachment on a person's self and invites sanctioning, perhaps creating a breach or scene in the public order. Indeed, seemingly innocent acts—such as inadvertently taking someone's place, butting in line, cutting someone off, and the like—can become a violation or “befoulment” of another's self and, as a result, invite an extreme reaction. Thus, social organization in general depends on the capacity of individuals to read those markers that establish their territories of self in public situations.

Violations of norms and territories create breaches and potential scenes, even when individuals are not engaged in focused interaction. These are usually repaired through ritual activity, such as (a) *accounts* explaining why a transgression has occurred (ignorance, unusual circumstances, temporary incompetence, “unmindfulness,” and so on), (b) *apologies* (some combination of expressed embarrassment or chagrin, clarification that the proper conduct is known and understood, disavowal and rejection of one's behavior, penance, volunteering of restitution, and so forth), and (c) *requests*, or a preemptive asking for license to do something that might otherwise be considered a violation of a norm or a person's self. The use of these ritualized forms of repair sustains the positioning, movement, and smooth flow of activity among people in unfocused situations; without these repair rituals, tempers would flair and other disruptive acts would overwhelm the public order.

The significance of ritualized responses for repair only highlights the importance of ritual in general for unfocused interaction. As individuals move about, stand, sit, and engage in other acts in public, these activities are punctuated with rituals, especially as people come close to contact with each other. Nods, smiles, hand gestures, bodily movements, and if necessary, brief episodes of talk (especially during repairs) are all highly ritualized, involving stereotyped sequences of behavior that reinforce norms and signal individuals' willingness to get along with and accommodate each other.

In addition to ritual, much unfocused interaction involves tact and inattention. By simply ignoring or quietly tolerating small breaches of norms, self, and ritual practices, people can gather and move about without undue tension and acrimony. In this way, unfocused interactions are made to seem uneventful, enabling individuals to cultivate a sense of obdurate reality in the subtle glances, nods, momentary eye contact, shifting of direction, and other acts of public life. Since so much action in complex differentiated societies occurs among strangers moving about in public spaces, the dynamics of unfocused interactions are critical to sustaining the social order of the society as a whole.

### Extensions of Goffmanian Dramaturgy

Goffman was, rather surprisingly, one of the first contemporary sociologists to conceptualize emotions. Indeed, sociology in general tended to ignore the topic of emotions between Charles Horton

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20 Ibid., 102–120.
Cooley’s analysis of pride and shame in the first decade of the twentieth century to the late 1960s and 1970s— a significant gap in theorizing given the significance of emotions in human affairs. Yet, Goffman never developed a robust theory of emotions but, instead, frequently mentioned the importance of embarrassment, or what we might see as a mild form of shame. When an individual cannot successfully present a self, and when he or she fails to abide by the script by talking inappropriately, incorrectly using rituals, failing to stay within the frame, inappropriately categorizing a situation, misusing stage props, or expressing inappropriate emotions, the negative emotions aroused in the audience will lead to negative sanctioning of the person who will, in turn, experience embarrassment. Often, the audience will not actually need to sanction those who have breached an encounter because individuals will typically recognize the breach and feel embarrassed. Under these conditions, a sequence of repair rituals ensues, revolving around sanctions, apologies, and re-presentation of a more appropriate face and line. People are motivated to do so because they implicitly recognize that the social fabric and moral order are at stake. Encounters depend upon the smooth flow of interaction that sustains the moral order. People in encounters are thus highly attuned to the cultural script and the mutual presentations of self in accordance with the script.

Even though Goffman himself did not develop a very robust conception of emotions, many of those who followed him did. The sociology of emotions did not exist in sociology during most of Goffman’s career, but by the time he died in the 1980s, the study of emotions and, hence, theorizing about emotional dynamics had become more prevalent and, today, is one of the leading edges of micro theorizing in sociology. Let me follow up on this observation by reviewing a sample of the sociologists who used the dramaturgical perspective pioneered by Goffman to develop new theories of emotional processes.

**Arlie Hochschild on Emotional Labor**

**Emotion Culture**

Arlie Russell Hochschild was one of the first sociologists to develop a view of emotions as managed performances by individuals within the constraints of situational norms and broader cultural ideas about what emotions can be felt and presented in front of others. For Hochschild, the emotion culture consists of a series of ideas about how and what people are supposed to experience in various types of situations, and this culture is filled with emotional ideologies about the appropriate attitudes and feelings for specific spheres and activities. Emotional markers are events in the biographies of individuals that personify and symbolize more general emotional ideologies.

In any context, Hochschild emphasizes, there are norms of two basic types: (1) feeling rules that indicate (a) the amount of appropriate emotion that can be felt in a situation, (b) the direction, whether positive or negative, of the emotion, and (c) the duration of the emotion; and (2) display rules that indicate the nature, intensity, and style of expressive behavior to be emitted. Thus, for any

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interaction, feeling and display rules circumscribe what can be done. These rules reflect ideologies of the broader emotion culture, the goals and purposes of groups in which interactions are lodged, and the distribution of power and other organizational features of the situation.

**Emotion Work**

The existence of cultural ideologies and normative constraints on the selection and emission of emotions forces individuals to manage the feelings that they experience and present to others. At this point, Hochschild’s analysis becomes dramaturgic, for much like Goffman before her, she sees actors as having to manage a presentation of self in situations guided by a cultural script of norms and broader ideologies. There are various types of what Hochschild terms emotion work or mechanisms for managing emotions and making the appropriate self-presentation: (1) body work whereby individuals actually seek to change their bodily sensations in an effort to evoke the appropriate emotion (for example, deep breathing to create calm); (2) surface acting where individuals alter their external expressive gestures in ways that they hope will make them actually feel the appropriate emotion (for instance, emitting gestures expressing joy and sociality at a party in the attempt to feel happy); (3) deep acting where individuals attempt to change their internal feelings, or at least some of these feelings in the hope that the rest of the appropriate emotions will be activated and fall into place (for example, evoking feelings of sadness in an effort to feel sad at a funeral); and (4) cognitive work where the thoughts and ideas associated with particular emotions are evoked in an attempt to activate the corresponding feelings.

As Hochschild stresses, individuals are often put in situations where a considerable amount of emotion work must be performed. For example, in her pioneering study of airline attendants, the requirement that attendants always be friendly, pleasant, and helpful even as passengers were rude and unpleasant placed an enormous emotional burden on the attendants. They had to manage their emotions through emotion work and present themselves in ways consistent with highly restrictive feeling and display rules. Virtually all encounters require emotion work, although some, such as the one faced by airline attendants, are particularly taxing and require a considerable amount of emotion management in self-presentations.

**The Marxian Slant**

In emphasizing emotion work, Hochschild not only incorporates elements of Erving Goffman’s analysis of emotions but also adds a critical edge that is more reminiscent of Karl Marx’s views on alienation. For Hochschild, individuals often engage in strategic performances that are not gratifying. Cultural scripts thus impose requirements on how they feel. As a general rule, then, emotion work will be most evident when people confront emotion ideologies, emotion rules, and display rules that go against their actual feelings, and especially when they are required by these rules to express and display emotions that they do not feel. Complex social systems with hierarchies of authority, or market systems forcing sellers of goods and providers of services to act in certain ways to customers who have more latitude in expression of emotions, are likely to generate situations where individuals must engage in emotion work. Since these types of systems are more typical of industrial and post-industrial societies, Hochschild sees modernity as dramatically increasing the amount of emotion work that people must perform. Such work is always costly because people

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24Ibid.
must, to some degree, repress their “true emotions” as they try to present themselves in ways demanded by the cultural script.

The Strategic Slant

Another extension of this line of reasoning is more in tune with Erving Goffman’s repeated fascination with how individuals “con” one another. If the feeling and display rules are known by all participants in an encounter, an individual is in a position to manipulate gestures in order to convince others that she also feels the same emotions and has the same goals when, in fact, she may have a devious purpose. A good “con man (or woman),” for instance, can appear to be helpful to people experiencing difficulty by displaying gestures indicating that he or she feels their pain and that he or she is doing his or her best to help them out of a difficult situation when, in reality, this individual is trying to cheat them. Yet, most of the time in most situations, individuals make a good faith effort to feel and express the appropriate emotions because the rules of culture have a moral quality that invites negative feelings and sanctions for their violation, even in seemingly trivial interactions. Thus, people implicitly understand that to violate feeling and display rules is to disrupt the encounter and, potentially, the larger social occasion.

Candace Clark’s Theory on the Dramaturgy

Candace Clark has extended the dramaturgical perspective with the detailed analysis of sympathy as both a dramatic and strategic process\(^{25}\)—two points of emphasis in Goffman’s theory. Like all dramaturgical theories, Clark visualizes a feeling culture consisting of beliefs, values, rules, logics, vocabularies, and other symbolic elements that frame and direct the process of sympathizing. Individuals are implicitly aware of these cultural elements, drawing upon them to make dramaturgical presentations and displays on a stage in front of an audience of others. Although there are cultural rules guiding behavior, many dimensions of culture do not constitute a clear script but, instead, operate more like the rules of grammar that allow actors to organize feeling elements, such as feeling ideologies, feeling rules, feeling logics, and feeling vocabularies, into a framework for emitting and responding to sympathy.

Each individual feels the weight of expectations from culture about how sympathizing is to occur, and each must engage in a performance using whatever techniques are appropriate to feeling and displaying the appropriate emotions. In particular, surface acting, deep acting, and use of rituals to arouse and track emotions are often employed by actors who are seeking to present a self in accordance with a script assembled from relevant cultural elements.

Strategic Dimensions of Sympathy Giving

There are also a strategic dimension to sympathizing, a point of emphasis that follows Goffman’s view of encounters as highly strategic. Individuals do not passively play roles imposed by a cultural

script; rather, they also engage in games of microeconomics and micropolitics. With respect to microeconomics, Clark argues that emotions are often exchanged in the sympathy giving and taking, and even sympathy as an act of kindness and altruism is subject to these exchange dynamics. Feeling rules often require that recipients of sympathy must give back to their sympathizers emotions like gratitude, pleasure, and relief. In regard to micropolitics, individuals always seek to enhance their place or standing vis-à-vis others, even when they remain unaware of their efforts to gain standing at the expense of others. Such contests over place vis-à-vis others introduce inequalities into encounters and, hence, the tensions that always arise from inequality. Sympathy, like any set of emotions, can be an important tool for individuals to enhance their place or standing in an encounter. By giving sympathy to someone, a person establishes that they are in a higher place since the person receiving sympathy needs help. There is a kind of strategic dramaturgy involved, and Clark outlines several strategies for gaining a favorable place: display mock sympathy that draws attention to another's negative qualities; bestow an emotional gift in a way that underscores another's weakness, vulnerability, problems; bestow sympathy on superordinates to reduce distance between places marked by inequalities; remind others of an emotional debt by pointing out problems for which sympathy is given, thereby not only lowering the other's place but also establishing an obligation for the recipient of sympathy to reciprocate; use sympathy in ways that makes the others feel negative emotions such as worry, humiliation, shame, or anger, thereby lowering their place.

Integrative Effects of Sympathy

Even though there is a darker side to sympathy processes in games of microeconomics and micropolitics, sympathy at the level of the encounter has integrative effects on the larger social order. First, positive emotions are exchanged—that is, sympathy for other positive emotions like gratitude, thereby making both parties to the exchange feel better. Second, the plight of those in need of sympathy is acknowledged by those giving sympathy, thus reinforcing social bonds per se, above and beyond whatever exchange will eventually occur. Third, sympathy operates as a “safety valve” in allowing those in difficulty a temporary release from normal cultural proscriptions and prescriptions while remobilizing their energies to meeting cultural expectations in the future. Fourth, sympathizing is also the enactment of a moral drama because it always involves invoking cultural guidelines about justice, fairness, and worthiness for those who receive the emotions marking sympathy. Fifth, even though games of micropolitics can make one party superior and another inferior (the receiver of sympathy), they do establish hierarchies that order social relations, although they also create the potential for negative emotional arousal and conflict.

Societal Changes and the Extension of Sympathy

Clark argues that the range of plights for which sympathy can be claimed is expanding. Part of the reason for this change is that high levels of structural differentiation, especially in market-driven systems emphasizing individualism, have isolated the person from traditional patterns of embeddedness in social structures. As a result, culture highlights the importance of the individual and the problems that individuals confront. Sympathy is now to be extended to “emotional problems” that individuals have, such as stress, identity crises, divorce, loneliness, criminal victimization, difficult relationships, dissatisfaction at work, home, school, and many other plights of individuals in complex societies. This same differentiation has created new professions that operate as “sympathy entrepreneurs” who highlight certain plights and advocate their inclusion in the list.
of conditions invoking sympathetic responses. The expansion of medicine and psychotherapy has added a host of new ills, both physical and mental, that are to be objects of sympathy. The social sciences have added even more, including the plight of people subject to racism, sexism, patriarchy, discrimination, urban blight, lower class position, poor job skills, difficult family life, and the like. Thus, modern societies, at least those in the West, have greatly expanded the list of conditions calling for sympathetic responses.

Given the wide array of plights that can be defined as deserving of sympathetic responses, there are implicit sorting mechanisms or cultural logics that enable actors to assemble from cultural elements definitions of who is worthy of sympathy. One cultural logic revolves around establishing responsibility for a person’s plight. Americans, for example, implicitly array a person’s plight, Clark argues, on a continuum ranging from blameless at one pole to blameworthy at the other. Those who are blameless are deserving of sympathy, whereas those who are blameworthy deserve less sympathy. “Bad luck” is one way in which blame is established; those who have had bad luck deserve sympathy, while those who have brought problems on themselves are not deserving of sympathy.

Clark adds a list of competing rules for “determining what plights were unlucky for members of a category” and, hence, deserving of sympathy. One rule is “the special deprivation principle” that highlights deprivations experienced by individuals that are out of the ordinary. Another is “the special burden principle” emphasizing that those who have particularly difficult tasks to perform are entitled to sympathy. Still another is “the balance of fortune principle” that those who lead fortunate and pampered lives (celebrities, rich people, and the powerful) deserve less sympathy than the ordinary person or the unfortunate individual. Still another rule is “the vulnerability principle” stressing that some categories of persons (e.g., children, the aged, women) are more vulnerable to misfortune than others and are thereby deserving of sympathy. Another rule is “the potential principle” arguing that those whose futures have been cut short or delayed (e.g., children) are more deserving of sympathy than those who have already had a chance to realize their potential (e.g., elderly). Yet another rule is “the special responsibility principle” arguing that those who have special abilities and knowledge, but who do not use them well or wisely, are less deserving of sympathy. And a final rule that is particularly important in establishing whether or not people are deserving of sympathy is “the social worth principle” emphasizing that people who are worthy by virtue of possessing status, power, wealth, cultural capital, and other resources are entitled to sympathy. There is, then, a cultural script for deciding who is deserving of how much sympathy in a society.

Clark notes that there are “off-the-shelf” ways in contemporary societies for expressing sympathy that involve a considerable reduction of the emotion work that a person giving sympathy must endure. These include: greeting cards, offerings (like flowers), prayers, tolerance of behaviors, time off from obligations, easing the pressure, listening, visitations, stereotyped rituals of touching and talk, composure work giving people time to put on a face, offers of help, and the like. But the use of standardized ways to offer sympathy still require some emotion work as the sympathizer tries to decide upon the right combination of these off-the-shelf actions.

One of the most interesting concepts in Clark’s conceptualization is the notion of *lines of sympathy credit* given to individuals. Each individual has, in essence, a *sympathy margin*, which is a line of emotional credit indicating how much sympathy is available to a person. These sympathy margins are, like all credit, subject to negotiation; just how much of a margin an individual can claim depends upon the individual’s moral worth, their past history of being a good individual who has been sympathetic to others, and the nature of their plight. Cultural rules
dictate that family members get the largest sympathy margins, that people who have social value (in terms of wealth, education, authority, beauty, fame, and other forms of social capital) receive large margins, that those who have demonstrated kindness and goodness in their other roles be given large margins, and that the deserving poor (and others in plight) who are trying to help themselves receive large sympathy margins.

There is, however, a limit to sympathy margins. If a person has used all of his or her sympathy credits, no more credit will be offered. And in fact, others will often feel and express negative emotions to those who have sought to overextend their line of credit. Moreover, if individuals who have been given sympathy credits do not attempt to pay others back with the appropriate emotions, those who extended the sympathy credits will withdraw further credit and experience negative emotional arousal.

**Sympathy Etiquette**

The processes of claiming, accepting, and repaying credit are guided, Clark argues, by “sympathy etiquette”—an idea that pervades Goffman’s analysis of encounters. Indeed, if the rules of sympathy etiquette have been breached in the past actions of a person, this individual will have his or her line of credit reduced. Thus, individuals calculate whether a person has a flawed biography or problem credit rating when deciding how much sympathy to offer. There are several basic cultural rules, Clark’s data indicate, that guide efforts by individuals to claim sympathy. These are phrased as prohibitions about claiming sympathy: Do not make false claims; do not claim too much sympathy; do not take sympathy too readily; do not take it for granted; be sure to secure some sympathy to keep your emotional accounts open and emotional credit rating high; and reciprocate with gratitude and appreciation to those who have given sympathy.

To these rules are corresponding rules for sympathizers: do not give sympathy that is not due; do not give too much sympathy out of proportion to the plight; and do not give sympathy that goes unacknowledged or underappreciated. People can under-invest or over-invest in sympathy. Over-investors do not follow the rules above, whereas under-investors do not keep their sympathy accounts open so that they can, if needed, make claims to sympathy in future.

**Randall Collins on Interaction Rituals**

Randall Collins’ conflict theory was examined in Chapter 3. At the core of this theory is the notion of interaction rituals, the elements of which roughly correspond to Goffman’s analysis of the encounter. For Collins, interaction rituals contain the following elements: (1) a physical assembly of co-present individuals; (2) mutual awareness of each other; (3) a common focus of attention; (4) a common emotional mood among co-present individuals; (5) a rhythmic coordination and synchronization of conversation and nonverbal gestures; (6) emotional entrainment of participants; (7) a symbolic representation of this group focus and mood with objects, persons, gestures, words, and ideas among interacting individuals; (8) circulation of particularized cultural capital; and (8) a sense of moral righteousness about these symbols marking group membership. Figure 3.3 on page 49 portrays the dynamics of such rituals.

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In Collins’ view, there is a kind of market for interaction rituals, which increases people’s strategic actions in interaction rituals. Individuals weigh the costs in time, energy, cultural capital, and other resources that they must spend to participate in the various rituals available to them; then, they select those rituals that maximize emotional profits. In this sense, Collins proclaimed emotional energy to be the common denominator of rational choice. Thus, rather than representing an irrational force in human interaction, Collins sees the pursuit of emotions as highly rational: People seek out those interaction rituals in a marketplace of rituals that maximize profits (costs less the positive emotional energy produced by the ritual). The search for emotional energy is, therefore, the criterion by which various alternative encounters are assessed for how much emotional profit they can generate.

Humans are, in a sense, “emotional junkies,” but they are implicitly rational about it. They must constantly balance those encounters where interaction rituals produce high levels of positive emotional energy (such as love-making, family activities, religious participation, and gatherings of friends) with those more practical and work activities that give them the material resources to participate in more emotionally arousing encounters. Indeed, those who opt out of these work-practical activities and seek only high-emotion encounters (such as drop-outs in a drug culture) soon lose the material resources to enjoy emotion-arousing encounters. Moreover, within the context of work-practical activity, individuals typically seek out or create encounters that provide increases in emotional energy. For example, workers might create an informal subculture in which social encounters produce emotional energy that makes work more bearable, or as is often the case with professionals, they seek the rituals involved in acquiring power, authority, and status on the job as highly rewarding and as giving them an emotional charge (such is almost always the case, for instance, with “workaholics” who use the work setting as a place to charge up their levels of emotional energy).

Not only are there material costs as well as expenditures of cultural capital in interaction rituals, but emotional energy is, itself, a cost. People spend their emotional energy in interaction rituals, and they are willing to do so as long as they realize an emotional profit—that is, the emotional energy spent is repaid with even more positive emotions flowing from the common focus of attention, mood, arousal, rhythmic synchronization, and symbolization. When interaction rituals require too much emotional energy without sufficient emotional payoff, then individuals gravitate to other interaction rituals where their profits are higher.

What kinds of rituals provide the most positive emotional energy for the costs involved? For Collins, those encounters where individuals can have power (the capacity to tell others what to do) and status (the capacity to receive deference and honor) are the most likely to generate high emotional payoffs. Hence, those who possess the cultural capital to command respect and obedience are likely to receive the most positive emotional energy from interaction rituals.

Meso- and macro-level social orders are built up, sustained, and changed by interaction rituals, depending upon the degree to which they generate positive and negative emotional energy. When the elements in Collins’ model (Figure 3.3) portrayed on page 49 are working successfully, people develop positive emotions, experience increases in their cultural capital, and develop commitments to groups. When these processes do not flow smoothly, or are breached, then the converse ensues—a line of argument consistent with Goffman’s analysis of when encounters are breached.

Finally, interaction rituals impose barriers to violent conflict at the micro level because individuals in a conflict situation have a legacy of the gravitational pull of interaction rituals, which are the opposite of violent conflict, and because potential conflict activates fear. This combination keeps individuals from participating in conflict and generally limits the duration and intensity of interpersonal violence. Yet, if interaction rituals can be chained together toward the pursuit of conflict, then violence is more likely to occur, but even then, fear and the pull of successful interaction rituals reduces the involvements of many who are organized for conflict.

If Goffman were developing the theory, he would make much the same argument, indicating that people derive positive emotions from encounters and are highly motivated to repair them when they are breached. Encounters thus sustain the social and moral orders of more meso and macro social organization, and they pull people away from interpersonal violence. Only when encounters are organized for violence that is perceived to sustain a moral order can they effectively be used for longer-term violence.

Conclusion

While symbolic interactionism and dramaturgy are often conflated, there is a significant difference in emphasis. Symbolic interactionists emphasize self and its verification as central to understanding behavior and the dynamics of interpersonal processes, whereas dramaturgy stresses that the script, stage, audience, roles, and rituals are more important. True, people present a self, a line, seek a footing, and other activities marking self, but much of this activity involves an effort to strategically position self in a situation and in the eyes of others. Self is not so much a motive force, as in symbolic interactionism, but a strategic force as persons play out roles on a stage in front of an audience. By comparing the assumptions and basic thrust of theorizing of dramaturgy listed below with similar lists in the last chapter, these differences become even more dramatic.

1. Interaction is a theatrical process of individuals making self-presentations to each other in light of several key properties of any dramatic performance:
   A. A script or normatively prescribed activities that should occur
   B. A stage or locale in which a variety of props can be used by individuals in their dramatic performances
   C. An audience of others who witness performances on a stage and offer their judgments of the quality of these performances
   D. Roles which are delineated in the script but which can offer individuals to add their own dramatic expressive interpretation of the role

2. Interactions are of two basic forms:
   A. Focused encounters where individuals are face-to-face with a common focus of attention, which is sustained by
      1. Rituals marking openings, closings, and shifts in the flow of interaction

2. *Forms of talk* appropriate for the situation that sustain the sense of intersubjectivity among persons and that allow interaction to be multilayered and complex

3. Tact and respect for others

4. Ritualized repairs to breaches in the interaction

5. Definitions of the situation, which are reached through 1 to 4 above and several additional processes
   a. Self-presentations that establish a line and footing of an interaction that is consistent with the collective definition of the situation
   b. Role enactments that are consistent with the script and emerging definition of the situation

B. *Unfocused encounters* in which individuals monitor each other’s actions but avoid face engagement, which would focus the encounter. Unfocused encounters are sustained by
   1. Body idiom in which individuals signal that they are engaged in a legitimate and recognizable behaviors, which are non-threatening
   2. Respect for the normatively prescribed territories of self surrounding an individual and that can be used in unfocused interactions
   3. Mutual understanding of the markers that define territories of self
   4. Ritualized accounts, apologies, or requests for actual or potential transgressions of the rules governing non-face engagement in public places

3. While all interaction involves a dramatic presentation on a stage to audiences, much human behavior is strategic in which individuals manipulate their self-presentations for specific goals, sometimes falsely and ingenuously.

4. Interaction always raises the potential for the arousal of emotions through breaches to an interaction caused by
   A. Failure to meet conditions listed under 2A and 2B above
   B. Failure to avoid face engagement in unfocused encounters and failure to sustain face engagement in focused encounters

5. Because encounters can be breached and arouse emotions, the expression of emotions is regulated by several layers of culture:
   A. *Feeling ideologies* that specify what emotions should and ought to be displayed in general classes and types of situations
   B. *Feeling rules* that specify the emotions that should be felt and *display rules* that specify what emotions should be visible to others in a particular situation

6. The cultural regulation of emotions often creates problems for individuals to abide by feeling ideologies and feeling rules, forcing them to engage in emotion work to present the appropriate emotions, even if these emotions are not felt.

7. The display of emotions can often be used strategically to present a disingenuous self and goals and in games of micropolitics to gain place vis-à-vis others and of microeconomics to gain resources vis-à-vis others.